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Chapter 9
Emerging Problems of
Fiduciary Liability
Brian T. Ortelere
With the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), Congress included a provision - section 404(c) - de-
signed to shift to participants the losses stemming from their exercise of
control over their investments in defined contribution plans. Until re-
cently, and notwithstanding the remarkable growth in the prevalence of
these plans, there has not been anyjudicial guidance on the meaning of
this crucial provision. Section 404(c), nestled among the general fiduci-
ary prudence requirements, carves out defined contribution plans (or
individual account plans) for specialtreatrnent:
(c) Control over assets by participant or beneficiary.
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and per-
mits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his account,
if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as
determined under regulations of the Secretary)-
(l) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by
reason of such exercise, and
(2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shan be liable under this part for any
loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant's or benefici-
ary's exercise of control.'
While bearing witness to the remarkable growth ofsuch plans, fiduciaries
have uneasily awaited the courts' rulings on the meaning and scope of
this ERISA provision.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in In re: Unisys Savings Plan Litigation2 represents the federal courts'
first foray into the fiduciary responsibility issues surrounding the ad-
ministration of these defined contribution pension plans. The Court in
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Unisys has impressed upon fiduciaries a host of new obligations that may
ultimately threaten the availability of this increasingly popular method of
delivering retirement income.
The Unisys opinion adopted a stringent standard of review for deter-
mining the prudence of investment decisions, while ignoring both the
discretion owed the fiduciaries in such circumstances and the causation
requirements in ERISA. With the adoption of such a standard for deter-
mining the prudence of plan investments, the Court of Appeals will re-
quire a trial on the fiduciary breach claims every time an investment does
not perform as anticipated. Further, and perhaps most troubling for plan
sponsors, the opinion requires that fiduciaries rebroadcast public infor-
mation on the status of plan investments, contrary to the explicit Depart-
ment of Labor regulations excusing fiduciaries from any such obligation.
Indeed, the Unisys opinion adopts a disclosure standard higher than that
contemplated under federal securities law, which are similarly predicated
upon the law of trusts.
Background of the Litigation
Defendants in the Unisys matter are the fiduciaries of the Unisys Savings
Plan, the Unisys Retirement Investment Plan, and the Unisys Retirement
Plan II (collectively the "Plan").3 The Plan is an employee-directed de-
fined contribution plan under ERISA sections 3(34) and 404(c), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), I 104(c). Of course, in a defined contribution plan
(such as the Unisys Savings Plan), "employees are not promised any
particular level of benefits, instead, they are promised only that they will
receive the balances in their individual accounts."4
The employee-investors, participants in defined contribution plans,
not the fiduciaries, bear the risk ofloss. Two commentators described the
risk allocation in these plans:
Defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate investment risk oppo-
sitely. Under a defined contribution plan, the employee bears the burden ofdisap-
pointing investment results and pockets the gains from good results. Under a de-
fined benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk. Since the employer has
promised to provide benefits at a certain level, the employer remains liable to pay
the benefits even if the fund turns up short. (Fischel and Langbein 1988, 1112-13)
To facilitate the management of their investments, the Unisys Plan
offered participants the opportunity to direct their money to any of six
investment options and, further, subject to certain restrictions, to trans-
fer their money monthly between these six funds. According to the Third
Circuit:
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Like its predecessors, the Unisys Savings Plan established an individual account
for each participant and offered several fund alternatives into which a participant
could direct contributions on a tax-<leferred basis: the Diversified Fund; the In-
dexed Equity Fund; the Active Equity Fund; the Unisys Common Stock Fund; the
Short Term Investment Fund; and the Insurance Contract Fund.'
In 1987 and 1988, Unisys purchased three five-year "guaranteed invest-
ment contracts" for inclusion in the Sperry Fixed Income Fund and the
Unisys Insurance Contract Fund.6 These contracts were issued by Execu-
tive Life Insurance Company of California and were then rated AAA and
A+ by two nationally recognized insurance ratings services, Standard &
Poor's and A. M. Best.' On April 11, 1991, California regulators imposed
a conservatorship, the insurance equivalent of a Chapter 11 corporate
reorganization, on Executive Life." Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs in
these consolidated proceedings filed twelve class action complaints in
the district courts of Minnesota and Pennsylvania, alleging that their
Executive Life investments were a total loss.
The district court granted Unisys's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed plaintiffs' claims, holding that the fiduciaries selection
of Executive Life GICs was based upon "solid, respectable and typical
grounds. "9 Moreover, because the participants had adequate informa-
tion from which to make informed choices regarding their investments,
the district court ruled that, pursuant to ERISA section 404(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ lI04(c), the fiduciaries could not be liable for the alleged 10sses. JO
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and remanded
the matter for trial. As to the initial investment, that Court held that the
prudence of the Unisys decision to purchase the Executive Life GICs
could not be determined without a trial.!! More specifically, the Court
held that the prudence of the fiduciaries' primary reliance on the insur-
ance ratings services, in selecting the Executive Life GICs, could not be
resolved on summaryjudgment. 12 While the Third Circuit described the
general prudence standards to guide the district court on remand, the
Court failed to address squarely the causation prong of the analysis, re-
quired by ERISA, which looks to whether the fiduciaries' actions caused
the alleged losses.
Moreover, while the Third Circuit held that Unisys may rely on ERISA
section 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § l104(c), in defense of the participants'
claims, the Court ruled further that Unisys' disclosures to participants on
the status of their investments could not be examined in the larger con-
text of publicly available information then available on Executive Life. 13
Section 404(c) recognizes that participants in such plans enjoy the right
to direct their investments as they see fit and, further, excuses fiduciaries
from losses associated with those investment instructions. To determine
whether Unisys gave participants adequate information regarding their
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invesunents, the Court of Appeals rejected Unisys' argument, grounded
in both the practical aspects of defined contribution plan administration
and the explicit Department of Labor regulations, that the fiduciaries
need not republish public information on these investments. In other
words, and equally troubling for plan administrators, the Third Circuit's
ruling requires defined contribution plan fiduciaries to somehow collect,
assess, and then republish public information on each of the many hun-
dreds of invesunents that may comprise a typical 40 I (k) plan portfolio.
Fiduciary Discretion
The Third Circuit's ruling on the invesunent decision squarely raises the
issue left open in the Supreme Court's ruling in Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. v. Bruch,14 that is, whether fiduciary decisions should be scrutinized
under the "arbitrary and capricious standard," particularly when plan
documents afford the fiduciaries discretion in such matters (and the
statutory scheme impresses investment risk on participants). However, to
the extent the Unisys Court announced an exacting standard of review of
invesunent decisions, that portion of the Third Circuit's ruling has argu-
ably been overruled in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Varity
Corp. v. Howe. ls
The Unisys opinion is also at odds with then Judge, and now Justice,
Scalia's opinion in Fink v. National Savings and Trust CO.,16 and its Circuit
Court progeny, recognizing that ERISA's causation requirements compel
the dismissal offiduciary breach claims where there is indisputable objec-
tive evidence of the prudence of the fiduciary's actions. Adoption of
either the Firestone/Varity or Fink approach works to avoid a full trial on
the prudence offiduciary investment decisions each time any plan invest-
ment falls short of expectations. The Unisys ruling presents such a night-
mare for fiduciaries (Schultz 1996).
Moreover, and as more fully discussed below, the Court in Unisys im-
pressed upon fiduciaries disclosure obligations inconsistent with ERISA.
The Third Circuit held that Unisys' disclosures to participants on the
status of their investments could not be read in the context of the variety
of publicly available information on Executive Life. In so holding, the
Court refused to follow the Department of Labor's regulations on the
issue, some 18 years in the making. Further, the Third Circuit's ruling
runs counter to the uniform standard on disclosures necessary under the
federal securities laws.
Given the relationship between 401 (k) plans and securities markets,
the Third Circuit's ruling may have untoward consequences for the na-
tion's economy (Williams 1996). To impress additional costs on defined
contribution plan sponsors and fiduciaries may result in the curtailment
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of the availability of such plans, to the detriment of both workers and
financial markets.I'
Although the Unisys Plan documents granted the fiduciaries discre-
tion in making the initial investment choice, and ERISA recognizes that
discretion is the hallmark of fiduciary activity, the Third Circuit, on re-
mand, ordered the district court to apply strict scrutiny to the prudence
question. IS Examining a decision ofanother administrative body or lower
judicial tribunal, a court \vill, at the threshold, select an appropriate
"standard of review." The level of scrutiny employed by that reviewing
court will often determine the outcome of a dispute.
The Supreme Court in Firestone held that, in certain instances, an
ERISA fiduciary's actions will be evaluated pursuant to the deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. In other words, the Su-
preme Court recognized thatjudicial scrutiny ofa fiduciary's decision on
a participant's claim for plan benefits need not be exacting. The Third
Circuit's opinion raises the question whether such a deferential standard
of review is appropriate in addressing fiduciary breach claims under
ERISA section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2), like imprudent selec-
tion of investments and failure to disclose material information, as
well as benefits claims under ERISA section 502(a)(1) (B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B).19 The Courts of Appeals have not uniformly resolved
this question.
As the Supreme Court held in Firestone, "ERISA's legislative hisLOry
confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions ... 'codif[y]
and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles devel-
oped in the evolution of the law of trusts.' "20 Further, and particularly
important to the determination of the appropriate standard of review:
Trust principles make a deferential standard ofreview appropriate when a trustee
exercises discretionary powers. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959)
("Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise ofa
power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an abuse
by the trustee of his discretion").
* * *
Hence, over a century ago we recited that "When trustees are in existence, and
capable of acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the
exercise of discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act. "21
Indeed, the Supreme Court's very recent opinion in Varity holds that
the standard applied to benefits claims should also govern the resolution
of fiduciary breach claims:
[C] haracterizing a denial of benefits as a breach offiduciary duty does not neces-
sarily change the standard a court would apply when reviewing the administra-
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tor's decision to deny benefits. After all, Firestone, which authorized deferential court
review when the plan itselfgives the administratardiscretionary authority, based its decision
upon the same common-law trust doctrines that govern standards offiduciary conduct.22
Although Varity seemingly compels the adoption of a deferential stan-
dard of review of the fiduciary breach claims at issue in Unisys, the final
resolution of that question must await a ruling from the Supreme Court.
Unisys' certiorari petition, however, was denied on October 7, 1996.23
Prior to Varity, the Courts of Appeals disagreed on whether discretion-
ary review is appropriate in resolving fiduciary breach claims under
ERISA section 502 (a) (2). According to the Third Circuit:
[W)e believe that after Firestone, trust law should guide the standard ofreview over
claims, such as those here, not only under section 1132(a) (1) (B) but also claims
filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) based on violations of the fiduciary
duties set fonh in section l104(a). Mter all, section l104(a) also abounds with
the language of trust law, and the Supreme Coun previously has noted that
"Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of
[fiduciaries') authority and responsibility."24
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has limited Fireslone's reach to
the review of benefits claims under ERISA section 502 (a) (1) (B):
We reject the argument that Firestone's arbitrary and capricious standard applies
to [defendants'] conduct in this matter. Firestone involved the denial of benefits,
and the Court stated that if the terms of the plan accorded the administrator
discretion in such matters, the decision should be upheld unless arbitrary and
capricious. However, we decline to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to
the fiduciary conduct at issue because this case does not involve a simple denial of
benefits, over which the plan administrators have discretion.25
As Unisys explained to the Court of Appeals, both the Department of
Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), during
the relevant time period, established a flexible standard for the pur-
chase of insurance annuities upon the termination of a defined bene-
fit pension plan, pursuant to ERISA section 4041 (b)(3) (A) (i), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1341(b)(3)(A) (i). In other words, to satisfy an individual's pension
benefit from one insurance company for his or her lifetime, both of these
regulatory agencies required only that the insurance company selected
by state licensed.26 This standard applies notwithstanding the fact that
the fiduciaries typically labor under a conflict of interest in such circum-
stances; that is, they stand to recoup any available defined benefit pen-
sion plan surplus.27
Aside from the fact that Executive Life was licensed by the State of
California, it had, at the time of Unisys' purchase, an AAA rating from
Standard and Poor's and an A+ rating from A. M. Best.28 Moreover, it is
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undisputed that no conflict of interest arose with the purchase of the
Executive Life GICs, and Executive Life was but one of the many insurers
in the Plan's portfolio. Mindful of the abundance ofproofsuggesting the
reasonableness of the selection of Executive Life, proper application of
the Firestone/Varity "arbitrary and capricious" standard would likely have
absolved Unisys from plaintiffs' claim to damages, without the need for a
trial.
Causation Requirements
The Third Circuit's Unisys opinion also ignores the express command of
ERISA section 409, 29 U.S.c. § 1109, and other Circuit opinions, requir-
ing that plaintiffs bringing fiduciary breach claims prove that the fiduci-
ary's actions caused loss. Following then Judge Scalia's lead in Fink v.
National Savings and Trust CO.,29 other federal judges have adopted the
"hypothetical prudent fiduciary" analysis to summarily resolve fiduciary
breach claims. These courts, properly accounting for the deference owed
fiduciaries and the statute's explicit causation requirements, recognize
that, if some objective proof of the prudence of a fiduciary's actions can
be mustered, no finding of liability is proper.30 Similarly, the Firestone/
Varity analysis - application of the "hypothetical prudent fiduciary" test,
required by a close reading ofERISA-would curtail the number offidu-
ciary breach claims to the benefit of both fiduciaries and participants. 31
Mter describing the general prudence standard, then Judge Scalia
observed that a second step is needed. ERISA's causation requirement,
contained in section 409, compels an inquiry into whether there is objec-
tive evidence of prudence. In such circumstances, a fiduciary cannot be
held liable in damages:
I know of no case in which a trustee who had happened - through prayer, astrol-
ogy or just blind luck- to make (or hold) objectively prudent investments (e.g.,
an investment in a highly regarded "blue chip" stock) has been held liable for
losses from those investments because of his failure to investigate and evaluate
beforehand.'·
The Eighth Circuit, building on Judge Scalia's opinion in Fink, ex-
plained further: "Even if a trustee failed to conduct an investigation
before making a decision, he is insulated from liability if a hypothetical
prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway."33
Although the Third circuit cited both Fink and Rnth on the general
prudence standard, the Unisys opinion makes no mention of the causa-
tion requirement and requires a trial, despite Unisys's proffer ofan abun-
dance of indisputable objective evidence showing the prudence of the
fiduciaries' actions.
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Fiduciary Disclosures
The Third Circuit's opinion also requires defined contribution plan
fiduciaries to retransmit publicly available information on the status of
participants' investments, contrary to the Department of Labor's explicit
regulatory command excusing fiduciaries from such an obligation. In-
deed, by tying this obligation to ERISA section 404(a), the Third Circuit
has unwittingly supplanted the Department's detailed regulatory scheme
for such plans, spanning, along with its "preamble," some thirty-<>ne
pages of the Federal Register;54 In effect, the Unisys opinion requires de-
fined contribution plan fiduciaries to run a "clipping service" for partici-
pants, collating and rebroadcasting the multitude of public information
on plan investments, cobbled only from ERISA's general fiduciary obliga-
tion to act prudently.55
The Third Circuit properly held that, on remand, Unisys may seek to
prove, pursuant to ERISA section 404(c), 29 U.S.c. § l104(c), that the
participants in this "individual account plan" caused the alleged losses.
In other words, the Court recognized that the Plan fiduciaries cannot be
held liable if the alleged losses "result[ed] from such participant's or
beneficiary's exercise of control."56 Consistent with the design of many
401 (k) plans, featuring varied investment options and participant trans-
fer rights, ERISA section 404(c) works to circumscribe fiduciary liability
upon a showing that the participant's personal investment decisions gave
rise to the claimed losses.
Nevertheless, the Court went beyond section 404(c), to the general
prudence obligations of section 404(a), to define the fiduciary's dis-
closure obligations in administering plans governed by 404(c). Building
upon a line ofunrelated Third Circuit fiduciary disclosure cases, constru-
ing the prudence standard of section 404(a), the Court reached the
alarming conclusion that Unisys was obligated to broadcast to partici-
pants public information on the status of their investments,limited only
by the materiality standard apparently borrowed from federal securities
law:
In our view, while Unisys was not obligated to share with participants everything it
knew about GICS and Executive Life, it was obligated to impart to participants
material information ofwhich it had knowledge that was sufficient to apprise the
average plan participant of the risks associated with investing in the Fixed Income
and Insurance Contract Funds in view of the purchase of the Executive Life GICs
and the financial condition Executive Life presented in 1990. Mareover; in this
regard, we do not, as Unisys urges, distinguish between "public" and "non-public" informa·
tion nar do we limit Unisys' duty to disclose to the latter.57
Oddly enough, and further clouding the fiduciaries' obligations, the
Third Circuit's opinion does not resolve "whether Unisys had a duty
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under section 1l04(a) to communicate anything at all to the Plans' par-
ticipants about these matters in the first place. "38
The Third Circuit now seemingly requires that fiduciaries comport
their disclosures with an amorphous standard derived from a mixed
bag of decisions involving everything but defined contribution pension
plans. Indeed, to look to the general fiduciary obligations of section
404(a), to define the disclosures needed under 404(c), runs counter to
the limited nature of ERISA's explicit disclosure requirements, spelled
out in ERISA sections 101,102,103 and 104, 29 u.s.c. §§ 1021-24.39
In that regard, the Supreme Court's holding in InternationalBrotherhood
ofTemnsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousers and Helpers v. Daniel;o underscores the
Third Circuit's error. Daniel emphasized the particularized nature of the
disclosures required under ERISA, as opposed to federal securities laws:
Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals expressly and in detail with pension plans.
ERISA requires pension plans to disclose specified information to employees in a
specified manner, ... in contrast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure
obligations imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts."
Cast adrift from ERISA's statutory moorings, the Third Circuit, contrary
to Daniel, has fashioned a new "rule" threatening the very existence of
defined contribution plans.
More specifically, the Third Circuit's opinion is directly at odds with
the Department ofLabor's 404(c) regulations. To keep defined contribu-
tion plan administrative costs down, the regulations explicitly relieve
fiduciaries of the disclosure obligation announced in Unisys. Under the
regulations, a participant's exercise of control under ERISA section
404(c) will not be deemed "independent" if:
(ii) A planfiduciary has concealed material non-publicfacts regarding the investment from
the participant or beneficiary, unless the disclosure of such information by the plan
fiduciary or beneficiary would violate any provision offederallaw or any provision
of state law which is not preempted by [ERISAJ42
Admittedly, the 404(c) regulation, by its terms, did not directly apply to
the Unisys dispute. 43
Nevertheless, that fact only further highlights the problems facing
fiduciaries in the wake of the Unisys opinion. By grounding the disclosure
obligation in section 404(a), as opposed to 404(c), the Unisys holding
applies equally to fiduciary conduct arising before and after the effective
date of the regulations. In other words, fiduciaries must now harmonize
the Third Circuit's opinion, based on section 404(a), and the Depart-
ment's 404(c) regulation. Because the two approaches are irreconcil-
able, the fiduciaries must either adhere to the Unisys ruling (at tremen-
dous cost), or terminate the plan.
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Moreover, and despite this Court's warning in Daniels, the Unisys opin-
ion's disclosure requirements surpass that required under the federal
securities laws. It is a basic principle of corporate law that a corporation's
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation's stockholders.44 De-
spite this fiduciary relationship, the federal securities laws do not require
the dissemination of public information regarding a corporation's se-
curities.4S While corporate law and ERISA share the same fiduciary un-
derpinnings, the Third Circuit has, without any basis in law or logic,
announced a more stringent standard governing disclosures on invest-
ments held on behalfof participants in ERISA plans.
The 404,cJ Regulations
The Department of Labor, in 1992, issued the regulations called for in
ERISA section 404(c). Although the regulations themselves are excep-
tionally intricate and defy ready characterization, a couple of highlights
bear mention. To bring itself within the "safe harbor" contemplated by
ERISA section 404(c), the defined contribution plan must offer partici-
pants at least three investment alternatives, each of which is diversified
and "has materially different risk and return characteristics. "46 Partici-
pan ts must also be able to transfer their money between these investment
vehicles, or funds, "with a frequency which is appropriate in light of the
market volatility to which the alternative may reasonably be expected to
be subject. "47
While the regulations include a laundry list of required information to
be disclosed to participants, so that the participants can exercise the
"control" contemplated by the statute, the plan sponsor need not dis-
tribute publicly available information on the status of plan invest-
ments.4S As noted above, however, the Third Circuit's Unisys ruling is to
the contrary.
Moreover, the regulations mandate that the operative documents spe-
cifically warn participants that the fiduciaries may be relieved from any
losses associated with the plan's investments. In other words, the fiduci-
aries may not invoke the 404(c) defense unless the participants are given:
[AJ n explanation that the plan is intended to constitute a plan described in
section 404(c) of me Employee Retirement Security Act, and Title 29 of the Code
ofFederal Regulations Section 2550.404c-l, and that the fiduciaries of the plan may
be relieved of liability for any losses which are the direct and necessary result of
investment instructions given by such participant or beneficiary.'·
Lastly, and as should be clear by now, because the Third Circuit in Unisys
grounded its disclosure obligations in the statute, rather than the DOL
regulation, it remains to be seen whether, in the future, a fiduciary's
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compliance with the regulations alone will effectively cut off liability for
investment losses.
Conclusion
In sum, the Third Circuit's Unisys opinion: (1) adopts a standard of re-
view for determining the prudence of an investment that ignores the
discretion owed fiduciaries in such circumstances; (2) fails to analyze the
explicit causation requirements in ERISA; and (3) dictates disclosure
standards higher than those adopted by the Department of Labor (and
required under federal securities law). The practical effect of the ruling
is to require fiduciaries to keep participants abreast of the status of the
hundreds, if not thousands, of investments in a typical 401 (k) plan, at a
time when regulatory burdens already threaten the availability of such
plans. To so engraft on section 404(c) duties derived from section 404(a)
will, contrary to the legislative intent, dramatically drive up the costs of
administering such a plan while circumscribing the availability of the
congressionally mandated affirmative defense. All told, fiduciaries can
expect to see an increase in fiduciary breach claims, whenever defined
contribution plan investments do not perform as anticipated.
It should be noted that the author and his firm have represented the
Unisys defendants since the inception of this dispute.
Notes
I. 29 U.S.c. § 1l04(c). The corresponding definitional section, 1002(34),
limits the application of this defense to certain enumerated plans:
(34) The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan"
means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each par-
ticipant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such
participant's accounts.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). Although ERISA was passed in 1974, the regulations called
for in section 404(c) were not issued until 1992.
2.74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996).
3. The three plans were "identical" and, as such, will be together described as a
singular plan (In re: Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 426-27 [3d Cir. 1996]).
4. Pension Benefit Guar. CO/po v. L7V Cmp., 496 U.S. 633, 637 n.l (1990). Such
plans have enjoyed phenomenal growth in the last ten years, eclipsing the use of
defined benefit plans to deliver income to retirees:
Brian To Ortelere , 89
Since the mid I970s, the private pension system in the United States has under-
gone considerable change. The most notable development has been the in-
creasing reliance on defined contribution plans over the traditional defined
benefit plans. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, the number of primary defined
contribution plans increased by 71 percent and the number of participants
rose by 83 percent; in contrast, primary defined benefit coverage showed vir-
tually no growth.
(Clark and McDermed 1990).
5. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 426.
6. A guaranteed investment contract (GIC) is a contract, issued by an insurance
company, "under which the issuer is obligated to repay the principal deposit at a
designated future date and to pay interest at a specified rate over the duration of
the contracts" (ibid., 426). The Unisys Savings Plan emerged from the merger of
the Sperry Retirement Program-Part B and the Burroughs Employees Savings
Thrift Plan (id.). Following the merger of the two plans, the Sperry fund ceased
to accept new contributions, but proceeds from contracts in that fund were
reinvested in the Unisys Insurance ContraetFund (id.).
7. Ibid., 427.
8. Ibid., 431.
9. In re: Unisys Savings Plan Litig., No. 91-3067, 1995 WL 29048, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 26, 1995). Summary judgment is a means by which a court may, in the
absence ofa dispute over a fact in a civil lawsuit, summarily grant ajudgment in
favor of a party to that suit (without the need for a trial).
10. Ibid., *3.
11. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434-37.
12. Ibid., 435-36.
13. Ibid., 443.
14.489 U.S. 101 (1989).
15. No. 94-1471,1996 U.S. LEXIS 1954 (U.S. March 19,1996).
16.772 F.2d 951, 961-65 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,j., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
17. Indeed, the mischief of the Unisys opinion will extend beyond the borders
of the Third Circuit. ERISA's expansive jurisdictional provision allows for suit
wherever a defendant "may be found" or where the "breach took place" (29
U.S.C. § 1132[e][2]). Hence, future plaintiffs, by suing in the Third Circuit, may
readily circumvent unfavorable circuit authority elsewhere, so long as the defen-
dant is found to have minimum contacts with the Third Circuit (an easy task given
the number of Delaware corporations) or the plaintiff resides there (e.g., Varsicv.
United States District Court, 607 F.2d 245, 248 [9th Cir. 1979] ["Congress' choice of
this term ['found'] for inclusion in the ERISA venue provision further supports
our conclusion that the provision is intended to expand, rather than restrict, the
range of permissible venue locations"]).
18. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 433-37.
19. The Supreme Court's opinion in Firestone was limited to the standard gov-
erning judicial review of benefits claims under ERISA section 502(a)(1 )(B). Ac-
cording toJustice O'Connor:
The discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of review in
§ II32(a) (I) (B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan inter-
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pretations. We express no view as to the appropriate standard of review for
actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA.
(Firestone, 489 U.S. at I01).
20. Ibid., 110.
21. Ibid., 111. The commentary to section 187 of the Second Restatement of
Trusts, the section relied on in Firestone, extends this discretionary authority to
investment decisions. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187, comment c
(1959) (the discretionary authority "is applicable not only to powers to lease, sell
or mortgage the trust property or to invest trust funds, but also to powers to
allocate the beneficial interest among various beneficiaries, to determine the
amount necessary for a beneficiary's support, or to terminate the trust").
22. Varity, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1954, at *45 (emphasis added).
23. A trial in this matter was concluded in the fall of 1997.
24. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559,570
[J985]). See also Mahoney v. Board ofTrustees, 973 F.2d 968, 971-73 (1st Cir. 1992)
(rejecting "strict standard of review" because "'Where discretion is conferred
upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power ... the trust's 'exercise is
not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of
his discretion' ") (quoting Restatement [Second] of Trusts § 186).
25. John Blair Communications, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360, 369 (2d Cir. 1994).
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 2617.2, 2617.4, 2617.22(d)(8) (Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation standard); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3 (d) (2)(ii) (A) (1) (Department of
Labor standard).
27. E.g., Riley v. Murdock, 890 F. Supp. 444, 458-59 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (purchase
of Executive Life annuities ancillary to termination of defined benefit pension
plan not a breach of fiduciary obligation, even if selection of annuity maximizes
reversion of plan surplus).
28. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 427.
29.772 F.2d 951, 961-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,]., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
30. Kuper v. Quantum Chemicals Corp., 852 F. Supp. 1389, 1397-98 (S.D. Ohio
1994) ("Indeed, evidence that independent, professional observers of market
trends differed in their projections offuture Quantum stock performance merely
underscores the fact that circumstances then existing would not have compelled
reasonable persons to a singular conclusion about the stock's future prospects....
Defendants cannot be said to have been objectively imprudent for having acted in
the same manner as impartial observers had recommended").
31. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Congo 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1994 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 4639, 4640 (ERISA designed to "promote a renewed
expansion of private retirement plans and increase the number of participants
receiving private retirement benefits"). See also Mertens V. HewittAssocs., 113 S. Ct.
2063,2071 (1993) ("ERISA [is] an enormously complex and detailed statute that
resolved innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests - not all in
favor of potential plaintiffs").
32. Fink, 772 F.2d at 962.
33. Roth V. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 1994). See also
Kuperv. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A] fiduciary's failure to
investigate an investment decision alone is not sufficient to show that the decision
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was not reasonable") (emphasis in original) ; Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors,
Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Proof of a causal connection ... is
required between a breach of fiduciary duty and the loss alleged").
34. See 57 Fed. Reg. 46906-37.
35. Unisys collected for the Court of Appeals a sample of the public materials
then available on Executive Life, from such sources as the Wall Street Journal,
Forbes, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the
United Press International, and the Associated Press. According to the Court of
Appeals, "[d]uring this time, Executive Life's condition was widely reported in
the financial press" (Unisys, 74 F.3d at 431).
36.29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2).
37. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 443 (emphasis added). The opinions from which the
Third Circuit's new disclosure rule was derived speak nothing of the circum-
stances unique to the administration of defined contribution pension plans
(Unisys, 74 F.3d at 440-4 I). See Unisys Corp. R£tiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litig.,
57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995) (modifications to retirement medical plan), petitionfor
cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.w. 3167 (U.S. Sept. 8,1995); Curcio v.JohnHancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994) (claims for life insurance and accidental death and
dismemberment benefits); Bixler v. Central PA Teamsters Health and Welfare Plan, 12
F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (participant inquiries regarding medical benefits);
Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.) (early retirement "window"
afforded defined benefit pension plan participants), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622
(1993).
38. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 442-43.
39. In so holding, the Unisys opinion also runs afoul of the Supreme Court's
repeated admonition that ERISA cannot be construed to create new rights and
obligations, absent an explicit congressional directive. E.g., Mertens v. Hewitt
Assoc., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (1993) ("Mague notions ofa statute's 'basic pur-
pose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the
specific issue under consideration"). Prior to Unisys, all assumed that a 404(c)
plan fiduciary need not look beyond that section to discern its responsibilities in
administering such a plan. (Sacher et al. 1991).
40.439 U.S. 551 (1979).
41. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonegjongen, 115 S.
Ct. 1223, 1231 (1995) (regarding ERISA's statutory disclosure requirements-
"This may not be a foolproof informational scheme, although it is quite thor-
ough. Either way, it is the scheme that Congress devised").
42.29 c.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (c) (2) (ii) (emphasis added).
43.29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-I(g)(l) ("[T]his section is effective with respect to
transactions occurring on or after the first day of the second plan year beginning
on or after the first day of the second plan year beginning on or after October 13,
1992").
44. "A director is a fiduciary" (Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588
[1875]). So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders
(Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 [1919]). Their powers are powers
in trust. See Jackson v. Ludeling, [88 U.S. 616,] 21 Wall. 616, 624 [1874] (" [The]
standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire com-
munity of interests in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders").
45. Sailors v. Northern States Power Co., 4 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The
securities laws require disclosure of information that is not otherwise in the
public domain") (quoting Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1323
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[7th Cir. 1988]); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership V. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212
(4th Cir. 1994) (same).
46.29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(B).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (B) (2) (ii) (C).
48.29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (c)(2)(ii).
49.29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (B) (l)(i).
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